International law presently addresses the unique challenge to international peace and security posed by trans-national terrorism through two frameworks of responsibility: first, individual criminal responsibility; second, state responsibility. These two frameworks of responsibility are not mutually exclusive and this article develops an analytic framework for shared responsibility in the terrorism context. The framework reveals that (i) in most cases of potential shared responsibility, two sets of actors (states and non-state terrorist actors) contribute separately to a harmful outcome; (ii) in cases where the terrorist conduct of nonstate terrorist actors is not attributable to a state, the nature of the wrongful act committed is different, even if the responsibility is shared; and (iii) where there is shared responsibility, the nature of responsibility which attaches to the wrongful acts of these distinct actors is itself different (criminal vs civil or delictual). This article further explores some of the difficulties in the interpretation and practical application of both the primary and secondary rules of international law which undermine the potential for shared responsibility in the terrorism context, or worse, are a recipe for no responsibility at all. It concludes with some alternative approaches to interpretation and application to address those difficulties.
Introduction
Trans-national terrorism is far from a new problem, and it often eschews the more new- * Senior Lecturer in Public International Law; UCL, Faculty of Laws. E-mail: k.trapp@ucl.ac.uk. This article is part of the collection of articles on Organised Non-State Actors, edited by Jean d'Aspremont, André Nollkaemper, Ilias Plakokefalos and Cedric Ryngaert. The collection was organised with support of the research project on Shared Responsibility in International Law (SHARES) at the Amsterdam Center for International Lawparticipating in acts of terrorism under the United Nations (UN) Charter) and the secondary rules of international law (in particular in the form of rules on attribution) provide a framework for state responsibility in the terrorism context. These two frameworks of responsibility are not mutually exclusive, and can form the basis of shared responsibility.
7 Section 2 below develops an analytic framework for shared responsibility 8 in the terrorism context. In particular, section 2 will explore how shared responsibility is based on the terrorist related activity of different sets of actors -NSTAs, even if acting as members of an organised group, 9 on the one hand, and states on the other. The framework reveals that (i) in most cases of potential shared responsibility, these different actors contribute separately to a harmful outcome (in the form of a terrorist attack or impunity for a terrorist attack), although where the terrorist conduct of the NSTAs is attributable to the state, the conduct is considered to be both that of the state and the NSTAs; (ii) in cases where the terrorist conduct of NSTAs is not attributable to a state, the nature of the wrongful act committed is different, even if the responsibility is shared; and (iii) where there is shared responsibility, the nature of responsibility which attaches to the wrongful acts of these distinct actors is itself different (criminal vs civil or delictual). 7 It is obvious that states may be responsible for terrorism related wrongs, each as discussed further below in section 2, as a matter of international law. In order that there be shared responsibility in international law, individual criminal responsibility for terrorism has to also exist as a matter of international law (even if the mechanisms for enforcing that responsibility or giving effect to that responsibility are purely domestic). Each of the TSCs defines a terrorist offence as a matter of international treaty law, and then imposes enforcement obligations on states (which enforcement obligations must be given effect to within that state's domestic legal system). The TSCs also oblige states to establish universal jurisdiction over the defined terrorist offences. The combined effect of defining terrorism as a crime under treaty law, and ensuring that individual terrorists 'travel' with their responsibility if they leave a territory which has not given effect to the criminal law enforcement obligations under the TSCs and enter a territory which has, is that the criminal responsibility is international (even if given effect to through domestic legal systems). To put this another way, as with international crimes under customary international law, it is no defence to claims of individual criminal responsibility that the individual acted within, or is a national of, a state which is not a state party to the relevant TSC or has failed to implement its obligations thereunder. The responsibility is international, whether or not it is also domestic. 8 The definition of shared responsibility in this article is adopted from the article introducing this symposium: 'situations where a multiplicity of actors [non-state actors and states] contributes towards a single harmful outcome that is not causally divisible'. D' Aspremont et al. 2015, section 2. 9 While individual terrorist actors are often members of a 'terrorist group', terrorist groups need to be distinguished from the other organised non-state actors addressed in this symposium. Terrorist groups, however structurally organised, are defined by shared objectives more than they are by shared bank accounts held in the group's name. Terrorist 'groups' are not independent legal persons -they are to be distinguished from MNCs or PMCs, which are incorporated within at least one domestic legal system, giving rise to the possibility of relying on domestic (rather than international) dispute settlement mechanisms in seeking reparations. In addition, international law does not impose primary obligations on terrorists qua group (as is the case in respect of armed groups participating in armed conflicts). As a result, there is little benefit in addressing terrorist activity through an 'organised group' paradigm and this article will instead address terrorist actors as individuals rather than as members of a group.
While the framework set out in section 2 makes it clear that there is potential for shared responsibility in the terrorism context, that potential is not often actualised in practice for a number of reasons. Section 3 will explore difficulties in the interpretation and practical application of both the secondary rules (in the form of the rules on attribution) and primary rules (in the form of state obligations to prevent and punish acts of terrorism by NSTAs) which undermine the potential for shared responsibility, or worse, are a recipe for no responsibility at all.
In particular, section 3.1 argues that the standard of attribution, developed in a context very different from that of state participation in terrorism, is overly strict in a way that undermines the likelihood that states will be held directly responsible for their participation in terrorist acts. The argument about responsibility in this case is a normative one -that the rules which establish an essential element of state responsibility (attribution) do not sufficiently allow for a finding of responsibility for participation in terrorism. The result is not that there is no possibility for shared responsibility -the state might still be held responsible for its independent acts in relation to (but separate from) the act of NSTA terrorism (for instance support for NSTA terrorism), while the individual NSTAs can be held individually criminally liable. It is rather that the possibility of shared responsibility in perhaps its purest formwhere different actors contribute jointly to a single harmful outcome and are held responsible for breach of the same norm -is undermined.
Section 3.2 will explore the limitations of the state responsibility paradigm in the face of failed or weak states, given that some primary rules (in particular the obligation to prevent) are territorially limited and conditioned by a diligence standard of conduct. These limitations of course affect the possibilities for shared responsibility. Where a state's factual failure to meet its prevention obligations creates the space for NSTAs to carry out acts of terrorism, the NSTAs can be held criminally responsible for their acts, even if the state might not be legally responsible (as a result of the application of the territorial limitation and due diligence standard) for its failure to prevent. This is despite the fact that the conduct of both the state and NSTAs separately and factually contributed to a single harmful outcome.
Finally, section 3.3 will explore the possibility that the aut dedere aut judicare obligation, tempered as it is by respect for a sphere of state discretion in domestic criminal law matters, might be a recipe for no responsibility at all (individual criminal, state responsibility or shared). First, the aut dedere aut judicare obligation may be a recipe for no legal responsibility on the part of a state. This is because the obligation recognises a margin of discretion that is broad enough to allow for lawful non-prosecution -even in cases where an NSTA within that state's territory has committed an act of terrorism. That recipe for no legal responsibility on the part of a state may then translate into no criminal responsibility for NSTAs (although in a practical, rather than legal sense). This is because NSTA legal responsibility is given effect to through a state's exercise of its domestic criminal law jurisdiction. When a state fails to exercise that domestic criminal law jurisdiction (in the form of extradition or prosecution), but that failure is not internationally wrongful (for example, because of a lack of evidence), the individual is -as a practical matter -not held criminally responsible while he or she remains in the territory of that state.
This article concludes (in section 4) with some remarks on the potentialities for shared responsibility in the terrorism context, reflecting on the challenges explored in section 3.
Analytic framework for shared responsibility in the terrorism context
In the terrorism context, shared responsibility takes the form of international responsibility on . But the difficulties involved in giving effect to a regime of criminal responsibility between sovereign and equal states (including the absence of an appropriate institutional infrastructure to implement the criminal responsibility of states, the impact of such responsibility on the still developing regime of individual criminal responsibility under international law, and the form sanctions might take in the event of such responsibility) resulted in the '"depenalisation" of State responsibility' within the framework of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (Crawford 2002, p. 36) . The concern that certain breaches of international law are more serious than others, which was initially framed in terms of state crimes, was addressed through provisions in the ILC Articles 19 or after (failure to extradite or submit the NSTA to prosecution) the fact. 20 It bears noting that in cases of a failure to prevent or punish, not every terrorist act results in shared responsibility, or indeed any responsibility at all. As set out in the matrix below and discussed further in sections 3.2 and 3.3, it is possible for states to factually fail to prevent or to extradite/prosecute an act of 14 There is also, of course, the possibility that a state might carry out terrorist activities through its own organs, rather than through NSTAs whose conduct is attributable to the state but who nevertheless remain outside the formal de jure structure of the state. This was for instance the situation in the infamous Rainbow Warrior case (1986, see n. 66 Assuming a terrorist attack has in fact been committed by NSTAs, the resulting matrix of shared responsibility in the terrorism context is set at the end of this section.
Relationship between NSTA and state responsibility for terrorism
Even when shared, NSTA and state responsibility for acts of terrorism are given effect to in distinct legal orders (the one domestic, the other international), and each is therefore established independently from the other. 21 In practice, however, the relationship between the two forms of responsibility is significantly more dynamic, particularly where shared responsibility is the result of a state's direction or control of an act of terrorism carried out by 27 See section 3.1 below. 28 A state's support for NSTAs (which support is material but does not rise to the level required for attribution noted in 'state act A' and discussed further in section 3.1 below) would also be an example of a separate contribution to a single harmful outcome before the fact. Shared responsibility for such support would be based on breach of different norms: the state held responsible for breaching the prohibition on support for acts of terrorism (a further specific instantiation of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, see Trapp 2011, §2.1.2) and the NSTA held responsible for breaching the prohibition on participation in acts of terrorism. As this particular form of shared responsibility is less problematic than those discussed further below, it is not addressed in any particular detail in this article. 29 
Challenges for shared responsibility in the terrorism context
Given the current focus on the individual criminal responsibility of terrorist actors discussed in section 2 above, shared responsibility rarely arises, even where there are serious allegations of state involvement in, or failures in respect of, terrorist acts by NSTAs. There are a number of possible reasons for the international community's failure to make use of the regime of state responsibility in the terrorism context -in addition to its reliance on an individual criminal responsibility paradigm -which use would result in shared responsibility. This article will address three difficulties in the interpretation and practical application of the primary and secondary rules of international law which stand in the way of ensuring that both NSTA and state parties which are factually responsible for contributing to a single harmful terrorist outcome are held legally responsible for that contribution.
The analysis below will track the possibilities for shared responsibility set out in the matrix in section 2, first assessing the responsibility gap which emerges as a result of the overly strict definition of standards of attribution (state act A, matrix above/section 3.1 below); second examining the real world limitations of the primary obligation to prevent terrorism as a recipe 30 See section 3.3 below.
for state responsibility (state act B, matrix above/section 3.2 below); and concluding with an exploration of the legal limitations of an obligation to extradite or prosecute, which limitations might be a recipe for no responsibility at all (state act C, matrix above/section 3.3 below).
The ICJ's strict approach to Article 8 attribution
Despite infamous cases like the Rainbow Warrior bombing (in which France relied on its own organs to carry out an act of terrorism), states are most likely to participate in terrorist activities through non-state actors who act on their behalf while remaining outside the formal structure of the state. 31 When the relationship between the state and the NSTAs carrying out the terrorist act rises to the level of attribution, shared responsibility between the NSTAs and the state for breach of the same norm arises. Indeed, where attribution is present, these different actors do not contribute separately to a harmful outcome, as the relevant terrorist conduct is considered to be both that of the state and the NSTAs. This is so even though the state's actions will have gone beyond those of the NSTAs (in that, in addition to having carried out the act of terrorism through the mechanic of attribution, the state will also have directed or controlled the NSTAs). Both the NSTAs and the state are held responsible for breach of the prohibition on the participation in terrorist acts -even though that responsibility is of a different nature (in that the individual is held criminally responsible while the state is held delictually responsible).
Whether such shared responsibility can be given effect to, however, depends in part on the extent to which the legal standard of attribution reflects the realities of the terrorism context.
The applicable standard of attribution -instructions, direction or control -is set forth in 
Nicaragua.
The answer to these difficulties is simply that the rules of attribution should not be applied so strictly as to deny the reality of state participation in terrorism. A flexible and contextsensitive approach to the application of Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which incorporates something like the 'overall control' standard set forth in the ICTY's Tadić decision, 39 is all that is required to respond to this difficulty.
But even in the absence of the attributability of terrorist acts, a state's failure to act in response to acts of terrorism -whether before the fact (in the form of a failure to prevent) or after the fact (in the form of a failure to punish) -might still amount to an internationally wrongful act for which that state bears responsibility. The next sections consider some of the difficulties in the practical application of the primary rules of international law addressing terrorism, which limit the possibilities for state responsibility (and consequently shared responsibility) in the terrorism context. In regard to non-inherent features of military operations, such a standard might well deliver the same result as the effective control standard in Nicaragua, but would respond better to the factual matrix of terrorist operations (where the crime is inherent in the use of force) by recognising attribution in cases where the state's overall control extended to its capacity to call off attacks.
Shared responsibility for state failures to prevent un-attributable terrorist acts
State act B in the matrix above details the second possible case of shared responsibility for a single act of terrorism -which responsibility is based on the independent acts of different sets of actors contributing to a single harmful outcome and arises as a result of the breach of different norms by those actors. The starting point is un-attributable terrorist conduct (for which conduct an individual non-state actor can be held criminally responsible). Shared responsibility results where the state is also delictually responsible for its failure to act appropriately in relation to terrorist conduct before the fact -through a failure to diligently prevent terrorism. 40 But as set out in the matrix in section 2, not every failure to prevent acts of terrorism results in shared responsibility. It is entirely possible for a state to factually fail to prevent an act of terrorism, for which failure it is not legally responsible. There are a number of possible reasons for the failure to make the jump from a binding obligation of prevention to successful invocations of state responsibility in the terrorism context (which responsibility would give effect to the shared responsibility of NSTAs and states in cases of individual prosecution), the most intractable of which is explored below.
Failed or weak states
Failed or weak states pose a particularly difficult problem in regard to terrorism prevention.
Such states lack the general capacity, resources or territorial control that is a factual prerequisite for effective counter-terrorism measures, yet it is by that very fact that they are the ideal safe haven for terrorist groups. 47 With the TSC focus on territorial prevention, such capacity and territorial control is also a legal pre-requisite for a finding of responsibility.
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The ICJ emphasised in both Corfu Channel and the Tehran Hostages case that international responsibility for a failure to prevent depends both on a state's knowing that there was a need to take preventive measures, and on the state's having the means available with which to comply with its prevention obligations. 49 The Counter-Terrorism Committee created pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) has engaged in a capacity building blitz the likes of which the international community has never before seen, but there continue to be a number of states which do not exercise the necessary control over the entirety of their territories for the purposes of putting developed counter-terrorism capacity to good use. state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/index.htm, chapter 5, discussing long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula in Somalia; widely spread islands in the Sulu Archipelago; difficult terrain in the Afghan and Pakistan border regions; and rough terrain and dense forest cover, coupled with low population densities in Colombia, as factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorist safe havens.
counter-terrorism obligations, they are also the states which are least likely to meet the criteria for being held legally responsible for failing to prevent. Such a finding of legal responsibility would in any case almost certainly be counter-productive (as any damages awarded against a weak and wrongdoing state for its failure to prevent would further detract from the resources it has available to put into counter-terrorism). 51 The counter-terrorism challenges these states pose are arguably more a question of political will, and the emerging interdependence of development and international security, 52 than legal responsibility -shared or otherwise.
An alternative to territorially limited prevention obligations?
A different approach to prevention in the terrorism context may be called for -one which responds to the trans-national nature of terrorist activity and emphasises the co-operative feature of the obligation to prevent, in lieu of its territoriality. 53 The obligation to prevent, as it is framed in the TSCs, over-emphasises the role of the territorial state (which may be a failed or weak state) and obscures the role non-territorial states might play in prevention. An approach focused on co-operation instead of territoriality could helpfully draw on the ICJ's decision in the Bosnian Genocide case (even bearing in mind the Court's warnings that its pronouncements were not a code on prevention generally, but were rather carefully tailored comments on the Genocide Convention) 54 -in which the Court adopted a 'sphere of influence' approach to prevention. 55 The Court in effect recognised that states which support extra-territorial conduct (even when that conduct cannot be tied to the state through the legal fiction of attribution) are thereby failing to prevent that conduct, because they are failing to use the influence inherent in their material support of NSTAs to prevent international crimes.
51 This said, a moderate damages award (a one-off cost) against a state which is further along the development index might prompt it to change its spending priorities, and to give more money to anti-terrorist efforts (as an ongoing matter). Such an approach has obvious appeal in the terrorism context given that state support for terrorism (both material and rhetorical) can rarely be tied directly to a particular terrorist act, but would certainly meet a general 'sphere of influence' standard, with failures to exercise such influence triggering legal responsibility. The result of such an approach to terrorism prevention would be to open up the possibilities for giving effect to shared responsibilityrecognising the factual role that states play in facilitating acts of individual terrorism through the application of a responsibility framework, without inappropriately catching states which could not but do otherwise (failed or weak states) in the shared responsibility web.
The problem with aut dedere aut judicare -a recipe for no responsibility at all
State act C in the section 2 matrix details the third possible case of shared responsibility for a single act of terrorism -which responsibility is again based on the independent acts of different sets of actors contributing to a single harmful outcome (in this case impunity for terrorism) and arises as a result of the breach of different norms by those actors. As with section 3.2 above, the starting point is un-attributable terrorist conduct (for which conduct an individual non-state actor should be held criminally responsible). Shared responsibility results where the state is delictually responsible for its failure to act appropriately in relation to terrorist conduct after the fact -through a failure to extradite or prosecute a terrorist actor.
But as set out in the matrix in section 2, not every failure to extradite or prosecute an act of terrorism results in shared responsibility. It is entirely possible for a state to factually fail to punish an act of terrorism, for which failure it is not legally responsible. For the reasons explored below, where the terrorist actor is in the territory of the state failing to meet its criminal law enforcement obligations, and where that failure is not one for which the state can be held legally responsible -the result is no responsibility at all: no legal responsibility on the part of a state, which translates into no criminal responsibility for NSTAs (although in a practical, rather than legal sense).
The TSC obligation to establish prescriptive jurisdiction over defined terrorist offences, 56 56 Under the TSCs, a state is required to establish its prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality and nationality principles, and in some cases is permitted to establish jurisdiction on the basis of passive personality and the effects doctrine. See e.g. Article 6 Terrorist Bombing Convention. A state is also required to 'establish … jurisdiction over the [defined terrorist] offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction [on the basis of the territoriality or nationality principles]'. In order to meet this latter obligation (coupled with the aut coupled with an aut dedere aut judicare obligation, 57 is intended to cover the field of possible jurisdictional difficulties a prosecution for trans-national terrorism might encounter. In particular, the TSCs were drafted to respond to the possibility that an alleged terrorist is in the territory of a state which otherwise has no connection with the crime or victims, but for whom extradition is impossible given the lack of a relevant treaty framework, an applicable exception to extradition, or because non-refoulement obligations attach to the state or states which might otherwise exercise criminal jurisdiction. But the aut dedere aut judicare obligation in the TSCs is also framed in a way that is sensitive to the practical difficulties of trans-national terrorism prosecutions -and this limits the extent to which the TSCs can be effective instruments for ensuring that there is no impunity for terrorist offences.
The aut dedere aut judicare obligation in the TSCs is framed in almost precisely the same terms as that under the Convention against Torture 58 , which was the subject of a recent judgment by the ICJ. In its Belgium v. Senegal decision, the Court rightly held that a state's obligation to submit to prosecution (which is triggered by the presence of an alleged offender in its territory) is conditional on non-extradition, but that extradition itself is framed in optional (not obligatory) terms. 59 Precisely the same is true of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation in the TSCs. Where an extradition request is made, there is nothing in the formulation of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation in the TSCs which requires the requested state to accede thereto.
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But where a state refuses to extradite, for whatever reason, it is thereby placed in the same position as a custodial state to which no extradition request has been made -it is under an obligation to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution. Such an obligation does not, of course, require that a prosecution in fact take place. All that is required of a state dedere aut judicare obligation, below n. 577), states must establish jurisdiction on a universal basis -as that is the only way they will be in a position to prosecute (in default of extradition) in cases where the terrorist act was committed extra-territorially and the custodial state has no connection to the terrorist actor, crime or victims thereof. is that it put its criminal law enforcement machinery at the disposal of terrorism prosecutions in good faith 61 without regard to the expense of any eventual criminal proceedings, 62 and that it be in a position to justify decisions not to mount a prosecution on objective grounds. The
Committee Against Torture held that if there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, a refusal to do so (even in the absence of an extradition request to which the requesting state accedes)
would not amount to a breach of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation under the Convention against Torture. 63 While the decision does not necessarily suggest that if there is sufficient evidence, a refusal to prosecute will amount to a breach of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation, it does account for the practical difficulties involved in mounting a trans-national terrorism prosecution and suggests that a decision not to prosecute should at least be justifiable on objective grounds. 64 That said, given the nature of terrorist crimes -in particular the secrecy with which they are planned and carried out and their trans-national component (which seriously complicates evidence collection) -there will often be objective reasons for a decision not to put public resources at the disposal of a terrorism prosecution (particularly in the case where jurisdiction is exercised on a universal basis). That the availability of objective reasons for not mounting a prosecution coincides with a custodial state's reticence to prosecute (for financial reasons or sympathy with the cause of relevant terrorist actors) will of course not deprive those reasons of their capacity to shield the custodial state from responsibility. Given that states are under no obligation to grant a request for extradition under the TSCs, the wide margin of prosecutorial discretion recognised in the TSCs potentially undermines the 'no impunity' objective of their aut dedere aut judicare obligation -in that such failures to prosecute will of course result in no practical responsibility for the NSTA (even if that NSTA did in fact commit the act of terrorism and is therefore legally responsibility). And where the failure to prosecute (if objective justifications are available) does not engage the state's responsibility either, there is no prospect for the effective implementation of shared responsibility.
The TSCs, however, are not without a tool-kit to address the complications inherent in transnational criminal prosecutions. In particular, each imposes mutual legal assistance obligations 65 -a serious commitment to which would go a long way towards ensuring that there are no objective reasons for refusing to exercise prosecutorial discretion in favour of bringing alleged terrorists to justice. A failure to prosecute in the absence of any such objective reasons would of course give rise to a state's responsibility for a failure to meet its aut dedere aut judicare obligation, implementation of which responsibility (in particular through the secondary obligation to cease the wrongful conduct) would then give practical effect (at least potentially) to individual criminal responsibility, and as a result, shared responsibility.
Conclusions
The international community's response to the threat of trans-national terrorism in part treats the state itself as a potential terrorist actor (within a jus ad bellum framework), and in part treats the state as the mechanism of control through which NSTA conduct is addressed. As a result, states are under primary obligations to both refrain from engaging in terrorist conduct on the one hand, and to prevent acts of terrorism by NSTAs, criminalise and punish any such acts which are not successfully prevented on the other. Trans-national terrorism is therefore a phenomenon which straddles the different frameworks of responsibility under international law -individual criminal and state responsibility -and gives rise to the possibility of shared responsibility.
That said, giving effect to shared responsibility in the terrorism context depends on the strength of these component frameworks of responsibility. For a variety of reasons, some of which were explored above, those component parts are not as strong as they might be. While the reflex response to grotesquely savage terrorist attacks tends to focus on criminal justice, reparation payments by the (allegedly) wrongdoing state 66 -emphasising the relevance of a shared responsibility approach. A shared responsibility project in the terrorism context is, however, not without its difficulties. Some of these difficulties, like those regarding the standard of attribution (examined in section 3.1 above), are easily enough addressed with flexibility, the eschewal of a slavish commitment to inapposite precedent, and a 'transnational terrorism context sensitive' approach to both primary and secondary rules of international law.
Other challenges, like those presented by failed or weak states to successful terrorism prevention, are less easily addressed through tinkering with the applicable legal framework.
Indeed such tinkering could be counter-productive in that making it possible to hold failed or weak states responsible for factual failures to prevent terrorism would further undermine their already reduced capacity to successfully participate in the 'war on terror'. As states increasingly recognise the interdependence of development and international security, and genuinely engage in capacity building endeavours so as to shore up the terrorism prevention capabilities of weak states, the need for a shared responsibility framework should decrease at least in respect of incapacity driven failures to prevent.
And still other issues explored above emphasise the extent to which the different forms of responsibility under international law are co-dependent. Individual and state responsibility as applied in the terrorism context are not only potentially shared, they are mutually reinforcing.
For instance, the framework of state responsibility could have an important role to play in holding states to their criminal law enforcement obligations -which will of course have its own positive effect on a 'no impunity' project and ensuring NSTAs are held individually responsible for their terrorist crimes. 67 In light of this co-dependence, successful implementation of shared responsibility for terrorism calls for a serious commitment to certain primary rules (for instance in the form of mutual legal assistance, as detailed in section 3.3 above). There is also considerable scope to exploit the increasing engagement between domestic and international courts in furtherance of a shared responsibility project in the terrorism context. Given the international community's reflexive reliance on a criminal law enforcement paradigm, and the catalysing effect domestic criminal convictions can have on invocations of state responsibility for terrorism, 68 a robust application of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation would ensure not only that there is no impunity for terrorist crimes, but also that shared responsibility is given effect to where relevant. 
